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Abstract 
This article considers the evolution of governance standards for determining the ex-
tent of an enterprise’s responsibilities to protect human rights in weak governance 
zones.  The article briefly describes the development of the standard and then evalu-
ates the standard as it has been developed and framed within the U.N. Guiding Prin-
ciples for Business and Human Rights and in the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 
Guidelines).  Particular attention will be paid to the Risk Awareness Tool for Multi-
national Enterprises which was developed to complement the OECD Guidelines fol-
lowing the call made by 2005 G8 Summit for the development of OECD guidance.  
The article suggests the ways that CSR has been transformed, in some respects, to a 
mandate for assuming governance responsibilities in those states unable or unwilling 
to institute systems of law that conform to international consensus standards on hu-
man rights. It also explores the challenges of the approaches of both efforts. Both 
acknowledge the autonomy of enterprises as directly responsible for the operationali-
zation of international norms wherever they operate. Yet both also open the door to 
extraterritorial application of law.  The same framework that advances the govern-
ance autonomy of enterprises also envisions them as the vehicles through which home 
states may project national power within host states with weak governance regimes. 
Or it may be understood as an important vehicle for internationalizing the law of 
states characterized by weak governance.  In this respect the weak governance zone 
principles parallels, on the private side, the efforts at legal internationalization gen-
eral to many bilateral investment treaties.  And this tension built into both frame-
works, a tension that goes to the dual character of enterprises as both autonomous 
governance actors and as creatures of the states in which they are domiciled, that 
mark the potential and the challenge to the internationalization of regimes of CSR.   
Multinational corporations (MNEs) operate in virtually every part of the world.1  
Their global operations are subject to a variety of rules. This is especially the case in 
matters touching on emerging global norms for corporate responsibility respecting 
social, cultural, environmental and human rights.2 The principal conventional obli-
gation of MNEs is to obey the laws of the jurisdictions in which they operate, or 
which may otherwise assert authority or some aspect of their operations.  This obli-
 
1. E.g., JOHN G. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2013).  For a more critical view, see also, RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A 
CRITIQUE (1999). 
2. E.g., JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:  
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); accord SURYA DEVA, 
REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: HUMANIZING BUSINESS (2012). 
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gation poses no particular issue where the state and its institutions are well devel-
oped. That is so even where there may be substantial differences between the law of 
the home states of MNEs and those of its host states.  But legal compliance becomes 
more challenging in weak governance zones, those jurisdictions, ostensibly states, 
whose governments are unable or unwilling to assume their responsibilities.3  “Char-
acteristics of such zones are likely to include areas of conflict and areas where seri-
ous violations of international human rights occur, often in the absence of account-
ability and with a broad failure of the rule of law.”4  
These weak governance zones represent some of the most challenging environ-
ments in which enterprises can operate.   
In his 2006 report, the Special Representative surveyed allegations 
of the worst cases of corporate-related human rights harm. They 
occurred, predictably, where governance challenges were greatest: 
disproportionately in low income countries; in countries that often 
had just emerged from or still were in conflict; and in countries 
where the rule of law was weak and levels of corruption high. A 
significant fraction of the allegations involved companies being 
complicit in the acts of governments or armed factions.5 
Traditionally, enterprises had little guidance.  For many enterprises, that meant 
operating in a law free zone.6  In such circumstances enterprises would sometimes 
 
3. See OECD, Investments in Weak Governance Zones: Summary of Consultations (Sept. 2015) 
(“These “government failures” lead to broader failures in political, economic and civic institutions 
that the OECD Investment Committee refers to as “weak governance”.”” Id., 1), available 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/35397593.pdf; see also Susan Rose Ackerman, Governance and 
Corruption, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 301-44 (Bjorn Lomborg, 2004).  
4. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF EMPLOYERS, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:  THE ROLE OF 
BUSINESS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES: BUSINESS PROPOSALS FOR EFFECTIVE WAYS OF 
ADDRESSING DILEMMA SITUATIONS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES (2006), http://www.reports-and- 
 materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Role-of-Business-in-Weak-Governance- 
 Zones-Dec-2006.pdf [hereinafter THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES]. 
5. John G. Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, 
INNOVATIONS: TECHNOLOGY, GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 189, 190 (2008), available at 
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/itgg.2008.3.2.189. 
6. The notion of a law free zone ought to be understood in a peculiar sense, not that corporations 
have no responsibility to comply with law, rather that they have no enforceable legal obligation 
to do so. Ursula Wynhoven, then of the United Nations Global Compact explained: “Regardless 
of whether governments are meeting their own duties, corporations must respect human rights; 
they don’t operate in a law-free zone. However, they don’t have a legal responsibility to do so. 
That’s the difficulty of holding companies accountable under international law and through 
international channels.” Danielle Marie Mackey, In a world of borderless business, who may 
enforce human rights? LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (July 2014), http://mondediplo.com/blogs/in-
a-world-of-borderless-business-who-may-enforce.  See also, John F. Sherman III, The UN 
Guiding Principles for the Corporate Legal Advisor: Corporate Governance, Risk Management, 
and Professional Responsibility (April 4, 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/human_rights/sherman_legal_advisors_paper.authcheckdam.pdf (“however, 
this business responsibility does not exist in a law free zone . . .”). 
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serve as the only source of regulatory authority within those areas in which they 
operated and with respect to those people with which they interacted. And some-
times they might find themselves, perhaps out of necessity, as complicit, directly or 
indirectly, in the human rights wrongs committed within the territories in which 
they operated. The problem was acute in areas of violent conflict and widespread 
human rights abuses, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South 
Sudan and Angola at the start of the 21st century.   
Business has been leery of any substantial public role, noting early in the process 
of the genesis of the creation of what was to become the United Nations Guiding 
Principles of Business and Human Rights (UNGP)7 that their role “also requires 
recognition of the legal and practical limitations faced by any non-state actor.”8  For 
business that means nothing more than “to obey the law, even if it is not enforced, 
and to respect the principles of relevant international instruments where national 
law is absent.”9 Yet, over the course of the last decade, global actors have been mov-
ing toward a rough consensus around the notions of the extent of the responsibilities 
of business in global governance touching on economic, social, cultural and some-
times political rights among those touched by their activities.10   More specifically, 
international actors and influential civil society elements have come to understand 
that enterprises operating in weak governance zones, especially in violent conflict 
areas, may have responsibilities of a kind quite distinct from a mere duty to comply 
with local law.11 For civil society, and increasingly, public international organiza-
 
7. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS ‘PROTECT, RESPECT AND 
REMEDY FRAMEWORK, (2011) available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ 
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [hereinafter UNGP] (“The Special Representative annexed 
the Guiding Principles to his final report to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/17/31), which also 
includes an introduction to the Guiding Principles and an overview of the process that led to their 
development. The Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in its resolution 17/4 of 
16 June 2011.’) Id. at iv. 
8. THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES, supra note 4. 
9. Id. 
10. E.g., ZERK, supra note 2; John G. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving 
International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819 (2007); Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo 
and Dorothée Baumann, Global Rules and Private Actors: Toward a New Role of the 
Transnational Corporation in Global Governance, 16 BUS. ETHICS QUARTERLY 505 (2015); Peter 
Muchlinski, Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications for 
Corporate Law, Governance and Regulation, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 145 (2012). 
11. E.g., Virginia Haufler, Governing Corporations in Zones of Conflict: Issues, Actors and 
Institutions, in WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE  102 (Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore and 
Susan K. Sell eds., 2010); Virginia Haufler, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An 
Innovation in Global Governance and Conflict Prevention, 89 J. BUS. ETHICS 403 (2009); 
Mungbalemwe Koyame,  United Nations Resolutions and the Struggle to Curb the Illicit Trade 
in Conflict Diamonds in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 80 (2005). 
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tions, it might mean more than legal compliance, even in the absence of the appa-
ratus of a law-state. Additionally, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of busi-
ness in that context might also extend beyond conventional CSR and acquires a more 
compelling character.12  The notion arises from the embrace of the judgment that 
such enterprises may inadvertently and indirectly help to provide both the means 
and the motive for violence or might enable local human rights violations by provid-
ing revenues that are channeled through weak fiscal institutions. As a consequence, 
the framework of transnational regulation of enterprises in such zones has embraced 
the premise that enterprises ought to bear a responsibility to provide effective pro-
tection of the human rights of local populations and to ensure that their activities do 
not enlarge conflict or serve to enhance or enable human rights violating conduct of 
governments or of combatants in the area.  Current efforts to establish governance 
frameworks tend to try to mediate between a central role for enterprises grounded 
on their public and societal13 obligations and a more peripheral role based on the 
premise that enterprises have a secondary public role.   
This article considers the evolution of governance standards for determining the 
extent of enterprises’ responsibilities to protect human rights in weak governance 
zones.  Part I briefly describes the development of the OECD Risk Awareness Tool 
for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones (the “Risk Awareness 
Tool”) standard14 and the UNGP for Business and Human Rights (and especially 
around Principles 7 and 23) and in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines).15 The 
approaches of each are compared.  Part II then considers some of the challenges of 
each system and of both applied simultaneously through the OECD Guidelines. The 
more significant of these issues are explored: (1) coherence and scope of coverage; (2) 
issues of definition; (3) risk and complicity; (4) the perils of a heightened managerial 
 
12. Critics have maintained that Enterprise engagement in business in conflict zones especially 
may pose a threat to those areas by inhibiting the ability of lawful government to assert 
authority.  E.g., Ans Kolk and François Lenfant, Multinationals, CSR and Partnerships in 
Central African Conflict Countries, 20 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 43 (2013). 
13. I use the term societal rather than social to distinguish the obligations from something that is 
discretionary or optional, to something that may be compelled by the rule structures of the 
systems within which enterprises operate—the governance systems of either enterprise self-
constitution, or those of the systemic rules within which the enterprise operates. See, e.g., 
Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of "Private" and "Public" 
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617 (2011). 
14. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD RISK AWARENESS 
TOOL FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES, (2006), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/corporateresponsibility/36885821.pdf [hereinafter OECD RISK 
AWARENESS TOOL]. 
15. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 2011 EDITION, (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
corporate/mne/48004323.pdf [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES]. 
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care standard; (5) legitimate and illegitimate political activities; (6) the projection of 
the ideology of legal internationalization into the private sphere; and (7) enforce-
ment and the role of the lawyer. The article suggests the ways that CSR has been 
transformed, in some respects, from the expression of the social responsibility of en-
terprises to a mandate for assuming governance responsibilities in those states un-
able or unwilling to institute systems of law that conform to international consensus 
standards on human rights. In that respect, weak governance zone principles con-
tribute to both the legitimation of extraterritoriality16 as a justified principle of gov-
ernance and also to the production of internationalized domestic law that has be-
come an important part of public law through bilateral investment treaties.  
I. The Regulatory Framework 
The debate over the scope of the responsibilities of business enterprises in weak 
governance zones arises in the context of a wider discussion about the societal obli-
gations of enterprises.17 The issue of the extent of the societal obligations of enter-
prises, their public purpose, has been ongoing in developed states for almost a cen-
tury.18  That discussion has been centered, in turn, on the issue of the scope of 
stakeholders which corporations serve.  One camp continues to hold that enterprises 
are centers of private economic activity (either permitted to operate through law or 
arising from the contractual arrangements among its stakeholders) which ought to 
serve its key internal stakeholders, principally shareholders.  A variant extends that 
scope to the enterprise itself.  In its most extreme form, this theory posits that the 
extension of any public purpose to private enterprises is itself anti-democratic. En-
terprises might engage in socially positive acts, but only to the extent that these 
ultimately serve the interest of the enterprise in maximizing the welfare of its prin-
cipal stakeholders.  This view continues to serve as the bedrock of most modern ap-
proaches to the legal regulation of enterprises in developed states. Another camp 
takes the opposite view.  They tend to hold that enterprises—as creations of the state 
and as recipients of substantial privileges by reason of their status as legal or jurid-
ical persons—ought to serve a public purpose.  That purpose might be understood in 
a number of ways.  That purpose might include an obligation to consider the effects 
 
16. Discussed in Daniel Augenstein & David Kinley, When Human Rights ‘Responsibilities’ become 
‘Duties’: The Extra Territorial Obligations of states that Bind Corporations, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT?  271 (Surya 
Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013). 
17. See, e.g., Rhys Jenkins, Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty, 81 INT’L 
AFFAIRS 525 (2005). 
18. See Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social 
Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2006). 
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of corporate activity on a number of outside stakeholders—labor, local communities, 
consumers and the like—even if that consideration reduces the ability of companies 
to earn income for their shareholders or otherwise increase their wealth.  As a con-
sequence, enterprises are said to have a social responsibility beyond its bare legal 
obligations, and sometimes despite them.  And, indeed, corporate social responsibil-
ity as a legal and operational concept arises from an acceptance of the premise of 
corporate purpose substantially broader than a purely internally driven economic 
one.  This view has found its greatest expression, not in national law, but in devel-
oping soft law frameworks at the international level and among civil society efforts 
to develop corporate behavior norms under the umbrella of corporate social respon-
sibility. 
At its most extreme, the view that enterprises have societal duties suggests that 
corporations have a direct obligation to ensure enforcement not merely of local law 
but also of relevant international norms, and that this obligation produces legal con-
sequences.  At its limit, it might suggest that states might have obligations of a na-
ture equivalent to that of states, and that consequently they may be liable to anyone 
affected by their failures. The view that enterprises ought to have direct responsibil-
ity for the enforcement of law and norms through their operations, has not yet 
gained a substantial enough following to be enacted in either national or interna-
tional law.  But the efforts leading to the failed Norms on Responsibilities of Trans-
national Enterprises19 suggests that there are enough powerful supporters of this 
theory to keep it on the political horizon.20  In any of its forms, the view of the societal 
responsibilities of enterprises has found substantial support within civil society or-
ganization and international public bodies.  To some extent, and in less pronounced 
form, it has also found some acceptance among enterprises, especially multinational 
enterprises.  
The embrace of the premise that enterprises do have a public responsibility has 
driven not merely the CSR movement, as an expression of societally compelled (ex-
tra-legal in its narrowest sense) obligation, but also the construction, by private and 
public organizations of rule systems for the articulation of CSR and its implementa-
tion.  Indeed, though states have been reluctant to change their legislative ap-
proaches to impose societal responsibilities on enterprises as part of their basic cor-
porate governance structures, states have been willing to develop, at the 
 
19. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, University of Minnesota (Aug. 13, 2003), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ 
business/norms-Aug2003.html.  
20. Discussed in Larry Catá Backer, Moving Forward The U.N. Guiding Principles For Business 
And Human Rights: Between Enterprise Social Norm, State Domestic Legal Orders, and the 
Treaty Law that Might Bind them All, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 457 (2015). 
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international level, a number of facilities for the articulation of guidance for socially 
responsible conduct.  These efforts are palatable from the perspective of states and 
enterprises because they are soft law—they do not produce legal obligations that 
may be enforced.  But for that reason, civil society and other actors, particularly from 
developed states, have found these efforts wanting.   
Two of these efforts have been particularly influential—the OECD Guidelines 
and the UNGP.  Both touch on related aspects of the societal responsibilities of en-
terprises beyond the obligation of relevant portions of the enterprise to obey the law 
of the jurisdiction to which they may be subject.  The OECD Guidelines and the 
UNGP are premised on the assumption that enterprises engage in activities in ter-
ritories governed by states that are well in control of their own territories. They as-
sume a functioning government.  But more than that, they assume a functioning 
government that is deemed a legitimate member of the community of nations.  It is 
that premise, for example, that underlies the whole of the critical first pillar of the 
UNGP that speaks to the state duty to protect human rights. That state duty to 
protect human rights, along with the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights (as specified in the UNGP), serves as the touchstone for the operationalization 
of the UNGP framework. The OECD Guidelines are recommendations addressed by 
governments to MNEs operating in or from OECD states.21 “The Guidelines provide 
voluntary principles and standards for responsible business conduct consistent with 
applicable laws and internationally recognized standards.”22 The OECD Guidelines 
extend “beyond the law in many cases.”23  They are supported by an implementation 
mechanism overseen by states—the National Contact Point System24-to promote 
and implement the OECD Guidelines.  And since 2011 they have also incorporated 
within their framework the substance of the UNGP.25 The OECD Guidelines are 
grounded in high standards of business conduct.26 
But what happens when the core premise of these systems of societal responsibil-
ity are undercut; that is, what happens when the state itself is unable to fully en-
gage?  That was the question central to the UN Expert Panel's report on illegal ex-
ploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo.27  The Panel 
 
21. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 13. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 17. 
24. Larry Catá Backer, Rights and Accountability in Development (Raid) vs Das Air and Global 
Witness v. Afrimex – Small Steps Towards an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the 
Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 258 (2009). 
25. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 3. 
26. Id. at 14. 
27. U.N. Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 
(Oct. 16, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2002/1146. 
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had been established by the United Nations in 2000 in response to reports of viola-
tions of international law in the course of the Second Congo War.  It determined that 
a large number of companies had not been observing the OECD Guidelines in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and argued that OECD states had failed in their 
obligations to promote adherence to the OECD Guidelines among enterprises estab-
lished within their territories.28 The issues raised by this expert panel bore fruit 
within the frameworks of the UNGP and the OECD Guidelines.  Each is discussed 
in turn. 
A. The UNGP Approach.  
The UNGP adopted a two-prong approach to the issue of enterprise conduct in 
conflict zones. That approach focused first on the state duty to protect human rights 
(the first pillar of the protect-respect-remedy framework of the UNGP).  It then elab-
orated a standard by which enterprises could assess the extent of their second pillar 
responsibility to respect human rights.  Together the UNGP establishes a regime in 
which home states are expected to manage the behavior of enterprises over which 
they assert a measure of control, including the enforcement of international norms 
extraterritorially through their regulatory power.29  And enterprises are expected to 
measure their own conduct against international standards for complicity in the 
breaches of human rights by those operating in the territories in which they engage 
 
Discussed in Vuyelwa Kuuya, The Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2008), available at http://www.google.com 
/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDIQFjAD&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fbusiness-humanrights.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fmedia%2Fbhr%2Ffiles%2 
FVuyelwa-Kuuya-on-UN-Expert-Panel-DRC-Nov-2008.doc&ei=lajSVLXYOsfFgwTdv4SIDA&usg 
=AFQjCNEFN8ayx0BDnXB_eyS3I_wKF0RsZA&sig2=lOjkmme_Ra_BthNlGO25Zg&bvm=bv.851
42067,d.eXY. 
28. The Report noted: 
The Governments of the countries where the individuals, companies and financial 
institutions that are systematically and actively involved in these activities are based should 
assume their share of the responsibility. The Governments have the power to regulate and 
sanction those individuals and entities. They could adapt their national legislation as needed 
to effectively investigate and prosecute the illegal traffickers. In addition, the OECD 
Guidelines offer a mechanism for bringing violations of them by business enterprises to the 
attention of home Governments, that is, Governments of the countries where the enterprises 
are registered. Governments with jurisdiction over these enterprises are complicit 
themselves when they do not take remedial measures. U.N. Security Council, supra note 27, 
at 31. 
29. Though the UNGPs are grounded in a more benign form of extraterritoriality it still appears to 
encourage extraterritorial application of the domestic legal orders of developed states at the expense 
of international norms applied by states within and without their borders. See Olivier DeSchutter, 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a Tool for the Human Rights Accountability of Transnational 
Corporations, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF LOUVAIN AND THE COLLEGE OF EUROPE (Dec. 22, 2006), 
http://cridho.uclouvain.be/documents/Working.Papers/ExtraterrRep22.12.06.pdf.   
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in economic activities.  
The first pillar of the three pillar framework, the state duty to protect human 
rights, forms the backbone of the UNGP framework.  That is a legal duty but is 
constrained by the willingness of states to adopt international human rights norms 
and to transpose them into their domestic legal orders. As such the precise extent of 
the state duty to protect human rights can vary widely from state to state. That 
approach first focused on the obligation of home states in the context of their duty to 
protect human rights (in this case through their regulatory power over enterprises).  
That duty extends, within the logic of the UNGP, to a duty to manage, through law, 
the behavior norms that ought to be followed by enterprises operating outside the 
national territory of the home state and in conflict zones.30  UNGP Principle 7 sets 
out the basic rule: “Because the risk of gross human rights abuses is heightened in 
conflict-affected areas, States should help ensure that business enterprises operat-
ing in those contexts are not involved with such abuses.”31 The obligation applies not 
merely to enterprise home states but also to states that are neighbors of the conflict 
zone.32  It is important to recognize, though, that the state duty under Principle 7 is 
limited to conflict zones.  It does not extend to weak governance zones in the absence 
of conflict.  That limitation is significant. 
Principle 7 then specifies the manner of compliance with that duty through a co-
ordinated program of management based on identification, assistance, penalties and 
regulatory constraints.33  First, the state may engage with enterprises at an early 
stage to “identify, prevent and mitigate the human rights-related risks of their ac-
tivities and business relationships.”34 This method seeks to develop coherence be-
tween the state duty to protect and the implementation of the corporate responsibil-
ity to respect human rights in a way that is managed by the home state, rather than 
 
30. UNGP, supra note 7, § 7, at 8-9.  The Commentary makes this clear: “In conflict-affected areas, 
the “host” State may be unable to protect human rights adequately due to a lack of effective 
control. Where transnational corporations are involved, their “home” States therefore have roles 
to play in assisting both those corporations and host States to ensure that businesses are not 
involved with human rights abuse” Id. at 9, Commentary. 
31. Id. § 7, at 8. 
32. Id. at 9, Commentary (“provide important additional support”).  The nature of that support is 
not specified though it would likely be measured by reference to that neighboring state’s own 
duty to protect human rights. 
33. Id. The coordination is made explicit in the Commentary, which provides that: 
home States should foster closer cooperation among their development assistance agencies, 
foreign and trade ministries, and export finance institutions in their capitals and within 
their embassies, as well as between these agencies and host Government actors; develop 
early-warning indicators to alert government agencies and business enterprises to problems; 
and attach appropriate consequences to any failure by enterprises to cooperate in these 
contexts, including by denying or withdrawing existing public support or services, or where 
that is not possible, denying their future provision. 
34. Id. § 7(a), at 8. 
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by either the enterprise or the host state.  Second, the state should provide assis-
tance to these enterprises “to assess and address the heightened risks of abuses, 
paying special attention to both gender-based and sexual violence.”35 The state, 
then, may manage responses in ways that contribute to the coordination of the state 
duty to protect under its national legal regime, and the corporate responsibility to 
respect under international norms. Third, where enterprises subject to home state 
control are engaged in gross human rights abuses and refuses to cooperate, then the 
state should help ensure that these enterprises be denied access to public support 
and services.36 Fourth, and more generally, states should ensure “that their current 
policies, legislation, regulations and enforcement measures are effective in address-
ing the risk of business involvement in gross human rights abuses.”37 This produces 
an additional duty on states under the 1st pillar—a duty to “warn business enter-
prises of the heightened risk of being involved with gross abuses of human rights in 
conflict-affected areas”38 The Commentary suggests that states review their domes-
tic law to address these heightened risks—effectively inviting the extraterritorial 
extension of national law to territories which the state has determined are experi-
encing a governance failure.39 Multilateral efforts are encouraged.40  And these obli-
gations are considered additional to the state’s obligations under international hu-
manitarian law in situations of armed conflicts and international criminal law, at 
least to the extent these obligations are recognized by the state. The extraterritorial 
implications ought to be troubling.41  Yet they appear necessary where, as here, the 
 
35. Id. § 7(b), at 9. 
36. Id. § 7(c), at 9 
37. Id. § 7(d), at 9. 
38. Id. at 9, Commentary. 
39. Id. “This may include exploring civil, administrative or criminal liability for enterprises 
domiciled or operating in their territory and/or jurisdiction that commit or contribute to gross 
human rights abuses.” 
40. Id. But these ought to be undertaken in a way that furthers the objectives of the UNGP.  See 
Id., § 10, at 11-12. 
41. Sara Seck notes one of the more troubling aspects of the new extraterritoriality, the increasing 
pattern of developed states to build two sets of normative standards for multinational 
corporations, one applicable within their jurisdiction and the other applicable to MNC activities 
outside the state. See, Sara Seck, Emerging Market Multinational Home States, Extractive 
Industries, and the Inside/Outside Problem, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (July 2, 2015), 
available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/sara-seck-on-emerging-market.html. A 
U.K. Parliamentary report noted: 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, we received far more evidence on the operations of UK companies 
abroad than about the human rights record of UK firms at home. The international debate 
on the impact of globalization and the cross-border influence of companies on human rights 
is more advanced than the discussion of corporate responsibility and human rights in the 
UK. 
 Human Rights Joint Committee, Any of Our Business? Human Rights and the UK Private 
Sector, 2009-10, H.L. 27, ¶ 72 (U.K.) available at, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
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UNGP framework contemplates states as the vehicle for providing international law 
governance in conflict territories.  The troubling part occurs where states are in-
clined to export not just their sense of international law, but their own domestic 
policies and laws as well.  
The second pillar of the three-pillar framework of the UNGP, the responsibility of 
enterprises to respect human rights exists independent of the enterprise obligation 
to comply with the law of the locations to which its operations and governance struc-
tures may be subject.  It is founded on the obligation to respect a basic set of inter-
national human rights.42 That responsibility to respect is operationalized through a 
process of human rights due diligence,43 which requires the enterprise to develop 
policies, implement them and then “to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for 
how they address their adverse human rights impacts.”44  Large transnational civil 
society actors remain skeptical of the promise of this approach and continue to push 
for some sort of legal superstructure to impose national obligations on companies for 
breach of transnational legal standards.45  
It is in recognizing this autonomous and independent responsibility, sourced in a 
specific set of international norms not directly imposed on enterprises, that the 
UNGP extended the scope of responsibility beyond the orbit of the state and of na-
tional legal systems. The corporate responsibility to respect human rights in conflict 
zones is founded on notions of context.46  Principle 23 provides that: “In all contexts, 
business enterprises should: (a) Comply with all applicable laws and respect inter-
nationally recognized human rights, wherever they operate; (b) Seek ways to honor 
the principles of internationally recognized human rights when faced with conflict-
ing requirements; (c) Treat the risk of causing or contributing to gross human rights 
 
pa/jt200910/jtselect/jtrights/5/507.htm.  
42. The International Bill of Human Rights.  UNGP, supra note 7, § 11, at 13. 
43. UNGP, supra note 7, §§ 16-22, at 16-25. 
44. Id. § 17 at 17-19. 
45. Among these is the powerful and influential establishment NGO Amnesty International.   
Although it is now widely accepted that corporations have a responsibility to respect human 
rights, too many times profits are built on the back of human rights abuses. Despite laws in 
many countries that allow companies to be prosecuted, governments rarely even investigate 
corporate wrongdoing. 
When communities’ attempt to get justice they are thwarted by ineffective legal systems, a 
lack of access to information, corruption and powerful state-corporate alliances. Worryingly, 
when the poor cannot secure justice, companies learn that they can exploit poverty without 
consequences.  
Corporate Accountability, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/ 
corporate-accountability/.  
46. UNGP, supra note 7, § 23 at 25-26. 
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abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever they operate.”47 The Commentary em-
phasizes that irrespective of the context in which they operate, all enterprises have 
the same responsibility to respect human rights wherever they operate.48 What con-
text changes is the nature of the response expected of companies as necessary to 
fulfill their responsibility.  
Some operating environments, such as conflict-affected areas, may 
increase the risks of enterprises being complicit in gross human 
rights abuses committed by other actors (security forces, for 
example). Business enterprises should treat this risk as a legal 
compliance issue, given the expanding web of potential corporate 
legal liability arising from extraterritorial civil 
claims, and from the incorporation of the provisions of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court in jurisdictions that 
provide for corporate criminal responsibility. In addition, corporate 
directors, officers and employees may be subject to individual 
liability for acts that amount to gross human rights abuses.49 
Complicity is the touchstone for responsibility. That is, that the responsibility to re-
spect human rights includes the obligation to avoid becoming embroiled in the vio-
lations of human rights norms directly applicable against states. In these contexts, 
the enterprise is expected not to exacerbate the situation.50 “In assessing how best 
to respond, they will often be well advised to draw on not only expertise and cross-
functional consultation within the enterprise, but also to consult externally with 
credible, independent experts, including from Governments, civil society, national 
human rights institutions and relevant multi-stakeholder initiatives.”51 The exper-
tise derives from two principal sources.  The first is the enterprises’ home states, 
under the framework established in UNGP § 7.  The second is through international 
norms, which most importantly include those developed through the OECD, the 
character of which is considered next.  
B. The OECD Approach—The Risk Awareness Tool.  
The UNGP provisions relating to conflict zones had not been written in a vacuum. 
Indeed, that approach effectively supplemented an earlier and more extensive 
 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 25-26. 
49. Id. 
50. See UNGP, supra note 7, §17, at 19 (“As a legal matter, most national jurisdictions prohibit 
complicity in the commission of a crime, and a number allow for criminal liability of business 
enterprises in such cases.”). The Commentary emphasizes the dual nature of complicity, as a legal 
concept and as a non-legal concept.  In the later case, it signifies a societal understanding that the 
corporation benefited informally from the bad acts of others. 
51. Id. § 23, at 25-26. 
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framework for the structuring of corporate responsibilities in weak governance 
zones that were established through the OECD as a complement to its OECD Guide-
lines. In response to this report, the 2005 G8 Summit directed a request to the 
OECD, for developing guidance for companies operating in weak governance zones, 
which together with the UN Security Council's call on OECD members to promote 
observance of the OECD Guidelines served as the impetus for the consideration of 
the development of a set of additional guidance in the context of territories where 
government was effectively absent. The result was the unveiling of an OECD Risk 
Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones,52 
adopted by the OECD Council on June 8th, 2006.  
The Risk Awareness Tool aims to function as a complement to the principles of 
behavior set forth in the OECD Guidelines as well as other OECD instruments.53  It 
was targeted for use in those contexts in which there was not a market failure re-
quiring regulation, but analogously, a governance institutional failure that may re-
quire additional responsibilities of enterprises operating within them.54 The defini-
tion of a “weak governance zone” is based on these core premises: 
A weak governance zone is defined as an investment environment 
in which governments are unable or unwilling to assume their 
responsibilities. These “government failures” lead to broader 
failures in political, economic and civic institutions that, in turn, 
create the conditions for endemic violence, crime and corruption and 
that block economic and social development.55 
Note that the definition does not link the condition of weakness to states.  The focus 
is on any area where governance is weak, even within states in which governance is 
strong in some, but not all of its territory. The definition draws on the work of the 
Development Assistance Committee’s Fragile States Group. The definition of “frag-
ile states” was premised on notions of limited state will or capacity to address their 
citizen’s basic needs.56 
The core premise of the Risk Awareness Tool is grounded in managing business 
 
52. OECD RISK AWARENESS TOOL, supra note 14. 
53. Id. at 11 (“Through its development of this Risk Awareness Tool, the OECD Investment Committee 
seeks to help companies in weak governance zones face these dilemmas and risks by calling to their 
attention to the guidance contained in OECD instruments and the findings of the broad-based 
consultations the Committee has conducted on this issue.”). 
54. See id. at 11-14. 
55. Id. at 9 (noting the slight variation in definition in the Introduction, “‘Weak governance zones’ are 
defined as investment environments in which governments cannot or will not assume their roles in 
protecting rights (including property rights), providing basic public services (e.g. social programs, 
infrastructure development, law enforcement and prudential surveillance) and ensuring that public 
sector management is efficient and effective.” Id. at 11.). 
56. Id. at 13 n.1. 
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behavior in zones of heightened risk—businesses apply the same international prin-
ciples wherever they operate, but exercise substantially more care and shoulder a 
greater governance burden, when they operate in places in which the state appa-
ratus may not exist.57 The Risk Awareness Tool itself is then framed as a set of 
questions addressing risks and ethical dilemmas that companies are likely to face in 
weak governance zones.  The Tool proposes a list of questions that companies might 
ask themselves when considering actual or prospective investments in weak govern-
ance zones. The questions cover the following topics: 
I) Obeying the law and observing international instruments 
II) Heightened managerial care 
III) Political activities 
IV) Knowing clients and business partners 
V) Speaking out about wrongdoing58 
VI) Business roles in weak governance societies – a broadened view 
of self interest  
Each of these question areas contains a set of questions and consideration that com-
panies might consider in framing the behaviors in territories with weak public gov-
ernance. The Risk Awareness Tool questions are also informed by a fairly detailed 
set of definitions,59 discussion of some of which will be taken up in Part II. We con-
sider each of the questions in turn.   
1.Obeying the law and observing international instruments.  This first question 
sets the basic rule.  In the absence of enforceable local standards, international hard 
and soft law standards apply. That is these international standards apply to inform 
the parameters under which an enterprise ought to measure its conduct in weak 
governance zones.60   The Risk Awareness Tool defines “relevant international in-
struments”61 as those cited in the OECD Guidelines, and note that enterprises “will 
need to evaluate their particular business situations in order to decide which instru-
ments are relevant to their operations.”62 Indeed, the questions suggest the value of 
enterprise use of and contribution to the development of these standards.63 It is im-
portant to note that, like the UNGP, the relevant international instruments include 
 
57. Id. at 12. 
58. Id. 
59. See generally id. at 35-42. 
60. See id. at 15 (“Because legal systems and political dialogue in weak governance zones (almost by 
definition) do not work well, international instruments that provide guidance on acceptable 
behaviors are particularly useful in these contexts.”). 
61. Id. at 39. 
62. Id. 
63. See id. at 15-16. 
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both hard and soft law instruments; some have no legal effect.  Moreover, it is pos-
sible that some of these instruments might neither have been ratified nor transposed 
into the domestic legal orders of home or host states.  In that sense, then, the stand-
ard for business conduct in weak governance zones are situated beyond the state 
and without reference to their legal order.  That referent affects not merely the 
sources of “law” for determining business behavior in weak governance zones, it is 
also relevant for determining the extent to which an “abuse” has occurred.64 The 
enterprise is counseled to be sensitive to the need for stakeholder engagement as 
well as the prudence of following a do no harm policy. Particular attention is paid to 
the possibility of abuse in the context of enterprise security services,65 money laun-
dering and corruption.66 
2. Heightened managerial care.  The Risk Awareness Tool draws a connection be-
tween heightened risks of abuse in weak governance zones and the need to operate 
under a heightened managerial care standard “in order to ensure compliance with 
legal obligations and observance of international standards.67 To operationalize this 
heightened duty of care, the Risk Awareness Tool looks to embedding relevant laws 
and international standards within the corporation’s culture and policies.68 Such 
policies ought to be promoted by the Board of Directors, be well communicated and 
ensure that front line employees are adequately trained.  But like the OECD Guide-
lines and the UNGP, it also extends this heightened care duty and the culture em-
bedding project, including the OECD Guidelines to all of the enterprise’s down-
stream supply chain partners, through encouragement, “where practicable.”69  
Heightened care is important in establishing appropriate corporate governance 
structures.  It is also central “in putting in place the management systems and ade-
quate internal company control that will allow it to manage the heightened risks of 
operating in weak governance zones.”70  It also plays a role in reporting and disclo-
sure systems.71 
3.  Political activities. The Risk Awareness Tool recognizes the need for political 
 
64. See id. at 35 (“Abuses” are defined as “acts that are excessive or improper when evaluated using 
widely accepted international concepts and principles for business conduct (see Relevant 
international instruments).”). 
65. See id. at 16-17. 
66. See id. at 17-18. 
67. Id. at 21 (The areas subject to this heightened care duty include “information gathering, internal 
procedures, relations with business partners. . . . and use of external legal, auditing and consulting 
services.”). 
68. See id. at 21-24; see also UNGP, supra note 7, §§ 16-22, at 16-25 (OECD mimics the requirements 
for human rights due diligence under the UNGP). 
69. OECD RISK AWARENESS TOOL, supra note 14, at 21. 
70. Id. at 22. 
71. See id. at 23. 
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engagement in weak governance zones.  It frames this question in terms of recogni-
tion of and separation between proper and improper involvement in political activi-
ties.72  Improper activities are those entered into with the objective of gaining an 
improper advantage.  And improper advantage appears to include efforts to secure 
waivers and exceptions from generally applicable law.73 Transparency is understood 
as a key feature of the legitimacy of political participation.74 
Yet underlying these efforts is a greater one—the effort to reduce the company’s 
exposure to and complicity in corruption.  
Companies in weak governance zones often find it necessary to forge 
political alliances with high level governmental and political figures 
in order to protect . . . in effect companies, through their political 
activities, create an informal system of investment protection that 
compensates for the lack of rights-based protection of their rights.75 
The Risk Awareness Tool offers application of the heightened care standard for 
managing at risk situations in what they describe as conflict of interest situations—
corruption generally.76   
4. Knowing clients and business partners.  It is in the context of this question that 
the Risk Awareness Tool and the UNGP most closely align.  The object of this section 
is to avoid complicity in the acts of business partners and others with which the 
enterprise must deal. “In weak governance zones, companies face heightened risks 
of entering into relationships with employees, clients or business partners that 
might damage business reputations or give rise to violations of law or other 
abuses.”77  Application of the heightened duty standard and reputational due dili-
gence78 are suggested as means of reducing this risk. 
5. Speaking out about wrongdoing. This question presents itself almost as the 
converse of the question on political activities. Here the Risk Awareness Tool pro-
vides a positive form of political involvement—as a sort of civil society actor in a 
context in which civil society may otherwise be absent.79 “Information about wrong-
doing (including crimes and abuses such as human rights violations, private or pub-
lic corruption) can be especially valuable in weak governance host countries, which 
 
72. Id. at 25. 
73. Id.; id. at 26 (“What steps can the company take to refrain from seeking or accepting exemptions 
not contemplated in the statutory or regulatory framework related to environmental, health, safety, 
labor, taxation and financial incentives among other issues?”) 
74. Id. at 26. 
75. Id. at 25. 
76. See id. at 26. 
77. Id. at 27. 
78. See id. at 27 nn. 2-3 (the reference here is made to the Guidelines on Reputational Due Diligence of 
the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers and the OECD Guidelines). 
79. See id. at 29. 
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have few institutions (e.g., free press, well developed legal and auditing institutions, 
active and free trade unions and civil society) that can collect and channel infor-
mation.”80 In that context enterprises might best serve host states by sharing infor-
mation about abuse with home and host state governments.  The Risk Awareness 
Tools concedes that such activity can be dangerous, and thus advises a careful 
weighing of the “costs, benefits and risks of speaking out or sharing information.”81 
There are a number of interesting tensions here.  The first is the tension between 
the need for silence and the possibility that silence may well constitute complicity.82  
The second is that the weakness of the governance zone may displace the obligation 
to disclose from the host to the home state.  And the last is the importance of balanc-
ing the risk to the enterprise against the risk to its employees and other stakehold-
ers.83 The Risk Awareness Tool references the facilities developed by the World 
Bank and the U.S. government’s “Bribery Hotline.”84 
6.  Business roles in weak governance societies – a broadened view of self interest. 
This last question is the most challenging; in it the Risk Awareness Tool seeks to 
make the business case for the societal obligations of enterprises.85 And it is also the 
one that remains the most contentious among the enterprises to whom it is di-
rected.86 “Individual companies and the business sector as a whole might . . . find it 
in their broad self interest—as important members of weak governance host socie-
ties—to help these societies get on the path of institutional reform.”87 Here again 
there is a tension between the economic and societal responsibilities of enterprises, 
as well as the tension between the obligations of enterprises to participate or not in 
the political life of weak governance zones. And underlying this public, societal re-
sponsibility, is the idea advanced that it includes a role to “advocate for widely ac-
cepted good policy practices.”88  
II. Consequences and Issues 
Both the UNGP and the OECD Risk Awareness Tool standards do much to de-
velop a framework within which enterprises may gauge, manage and structure their 
activities in weak governance zones.  But like other new set of standards, both raise 
 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. at 29-30. 
84. Id. at 30 n.1. 
85. See id. at 31-33. 
86. See id. 
87. Id. at 31. 
88. Id. at 32. 
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a number of issues that have neither been resolved nor might they promote the in-
tended effect.  The more significant of these issues are raised here: 
A. Coherence—Scope of Coverage.   
One of the more important structural objectives of the UNGP is to enhance regu-
latory coherence, and where that is impossible, at least seek regulatory coordination.  
It is not clear that these standards together contribute to those objectives.  First, the 
two standards do not cover the same ground.  The UNGP are focused on conflict 
zones.  The OECD Risk Awareness Tool is focused on weak governance zones.  They 
both seek to reach the public sphere equivalent of market failures of the sort that 
propelled the CSR movement nearly a generation ago—governance or institutional 
failures at the state level. Yet they do not reach the same set of actors.  Coordination 
becomes more difficult in this context and implementation within an enterprise be-
comes more difficult (in terms of resources necessary to comply) where the standards 
may apply jointly in some contexts but not in others.  Beyond that, of course, the 
difference may permit strategic behavior of the sort that the standards mean to dis-
courage.  
Second, the two approaches are distinct enough to raise a question of coherence 
and coordination.  The UNGP focus on state duties to extend the reach of their na-
tional power to conflict zones.  That effectively suggests that within conflict zones 
any number of states may project their national law on the backs of the enterprises 
domiciled in their jurisdictions as well as all of those individuals and entities in-
volved in that enterprise to the extent of their relationships.  The resulting fracture 
produces a strange mix of law in conflict zones, one where the laws of multiple juris-
dictions may apply unevenly through the activities of enterprises.  The UNGP focus 
on corporate responsibility targets complicity. The Risk Awareness Tool, on the 
other hand, focuses on risk to the enterprise.89  It also targets compliance with in-
ternational norms in the context of weak governance zones and suggests a smaller 
role for extraterritoriality concepts in regulation.90 On one hand, the Risk Aware-
 
89. See generally id. at 12. 
90. The has been more sensitive to concerns of developing states on this score, though in the service of 
internationalism rather than of preserving any sort of distinct sovereign dignity for fragile or 
developing states.  See, e.g., OECD, Investments in Weak Governance Zones: Summary of 
Consultations (Sept. 2015), supra. 3 (“Home country and international organizations can play 
important -- but only supporting -- roles in assisting weak governance host countries to get on the 
path to reform.” Id., at 3). Civil society has sought a broader scope for extraterritoriality, grounded 
in the power of developed states to export their domestic legal orders with the economic activities 
of enterprises they might control.  See, e.g., Comments in response to the UN Special Representative 
of the Secretary General on Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises’ Guiding 
Principles – Proposed Outline, AMNESTY INT’L 1, 16-17 (October 2010), https://www.amnesty.org/ 
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ness Tool is more explicit in promoting the autonomous public and societal respon-
sibility of enterprises in these zones. On the other, the UNGP, standing alone, ap-
pears more concerned about derivative liability. Yet that raises questions.  A com-
plicity and legal compliance touchtone seems to be a cautious approach in light of 
the overall framework of the corporate responsibility, which is grounded on risk as-
sessment, prevention and mitigation.91  While the two approaches are not incompat-
ible, their methodologies are distinct enough to raise issues of institutional costs.  It 
also raises the possibilities that application of the two methodologies might not, in 
every circumstance, produce the same result in terms of corporate behavior.  
In the face of the many voluntary structures that have been developed to help 
guide states and economic actors in this context, one might well ask whether coher-
ence and coordination are even relevant to the analysis.92  One easy answer is that 
they are not relevant in any significant respect. The OECD suggests that these dis-
tinct approaches represent a recognition of the essential polycentricity of the gov-
ernance framework within which global economic activity functions—between, 
within and beyond states, and beyond the competence of any single actor to control 
fully.93 The UNGP is itself built on the premise of a social license to operate that 
may be autonomous of the state’s public power.94  Another intimates that the weak-
ness of states is in itself not an inevitable indicator of weak governance, in part pre-
cisely because governance is now transnational and polycentric, and may be taken 
up by others.95  Yet this last point makes a stronger case for coherence and coordi-
nation among those normative structures that mean to guide non state actors (and 
manage the temptations of states contemplating projecting their authority into other 
states).  Governance processes do not need the state so much as they need modes of 
 
en/documents/IOR50/001/2010/en. 
91. See INT’L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE MINING AND METALS INDUSTRY: 
INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE INTO CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES 28 
(March 2012), http://www.icmm.com/document/3308. 
92. The OECD has recognized “[t]he rapid growth of initiatives to help improve the situation in weak 
governance zones – sponsored by home and host governments, international organizations, 
businesses  and business associations, NGOs and trade unions –  suggests that a broad, global effort 
to address these issues has developed.” OECD, Investments in Weak Governance Zones: Summary 
of Consultations (Sept. 2015), supra note 3. 
93. Id., 3-5. 
94. See John G. Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, 
MIT INNOVATIONS 189-212 (2008), available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ 
itgg.2008.3.2.18.  See generally Kathleen M. Wilburn & Ralph Wilburn, Achieving Social License 
To Operate Using Stakeholder Theory, 4 J.INT’L BUS.  ETHICS 2, 3-16 (2011). 
95. See, e.g.,  Faisal Z. Ahmed, Anne Greenleaf, and Audrey Sacks, The Paradox of Export Growth in 
Areas of Weak Governance: The Case of the Ready Made Garment Sector in Bangladesh, 56 WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT 258-71 (2014); Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, Governance Without a State: Can 
it Work?, 4 REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE 113-134 (2010) (“social norms of local, national, or 
international communities often create a strong logic of appropriateness” Id., 114).  
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societal coordination that are either to be provided instrumentally—by conscious co-
ordination among institutional actors—or in markets.96 Or, alternatively, competi-
tion among systems in the marketplace of governance may eventually sort things 
out—either by displacing all but one system or, more likely, by merging them into 
some sort of workable approach—derived from pragmatic implementation over time 
rather than by the application of any sort of instrumental oversight. In the case of 
the governance structures for projecting non state power within weak governance or 
conflict zones, the answer to the coordination problem will depend on the way in 
which enterprises embed CSR and business and human rights practices within their 
operational structures for decision making and reporting and the way in which the 
OECD’s NCP’s special instance jurisprudence evolves.97  
B. Issues of Definition—What Are Weak Governance or Conflict 
Zones and Who Decides?   
The issue of application looms large under both standards.  The UNGP define 
“conflict zones” indirectly through references in their commentary (e.g., “conflict af-
fected area”).98 The Risk Awareness Tool attempts a definition of “weak governance 
zone” explicitly.99  That raises two issues.  The first relates to the meaning of these 
terms.  The second relates to who is empowered to make the determination of what 
qualifies either as a weak governance or conflict zone. 
While conflict zone or conflict affected area appears on its face to be fairly straight-
forward, a closer analysis reveals some difficult issues.  It is clear that war zones 
come within the definition.  It is also clear that territories touched by civil war, 
broadly defined, also qualify.  But there are substantial areas within states in which 
there is not recognized conflict that might also come within the meaning of the term.  
For example, a state like Mexico might be deemed to include “conflict zones”, defined 
as those areas effectively controlled by narco-traffickers. At its limits, territories 
deemed to be high crime zones—portions of Chicago or Detroit perhaps—might also 
be included.100  But that might not reflect the intent of the drafters.  The words, 
 
96. Börzel and Risse, supra note 95, 120-126 (speaking to what they reference as the shadow of 
hierarchy in the absence of the state. 
97. Cf. Ashley L. Santer, A Soft Law Mechanism for Corporate Responsibility: How the Updated OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Promote Business for the Future, 43 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. 
REV. 375 (2011). 
98. UNGP, supra note 7, § 23, at 25-26. 
99. See OECD RISK AWARENESS TOOL, supra note 14, at 42. 
100. See, e.g., Adam Chandler, Chicago’s Problem With Gun Violence, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2015) 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/09/chicago-shooting-record-
year/408070/; Daniel Fisher, America’s Most Dangerous Cities; Detroit Can’t Shake No. 1 Spot, 
FORBES, Oct. 29, 2015, available http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/10/29/americas-
most-dangerous-cities-detroit-cant-shake-no-1-spot/. 
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though, survive its drafters and states which seek to apply it, may not be bound by 
any notion of legislative or original intention.   
More interesting perhaps is the open-endedness of the Risk Awareness Tool defi-
nition of a “weak governance zone”.  One of the two markers of such a zone is subject 
to a fairly straightforward analysis grounded in data.  It is presented as an objective 
standard, derived from markers of development and stability—where governments 
are unable to assume their role and responsibility in protecting rights. To a large 
extent, those markers go to the incapacity of a government to deliver the choice of 
data services and provide an institutional framework that is viewed as legitimate. 
Those markers are themselves derived from standards developed through the 
United Nations, by international financial institutions or by civil society actors.101  
But the objectivity of this data driven standard also veils the ideological presump-
tions that underlie the choice of markers.  The markers tend to enhance the project 
of global socialization to a standard of behavior, and an expectation of material cul-
ture that reflects the views of these global institutions.  This is not to suggest at all 
that this sort of “ideal standard” embedded in the markers is bad.  Not at all, but it 
does suggest that states that might lag are now more open to legal colonization 
through the importation of host state law through enterprises operating in their ter-
ritories when such states are labeled weak.  That possibility is exacerbated by the 
second criterion for weak governance. 
Just as a state may be labeled a weak governance zone when it lacks capacity, so 
might be labeled a weak governance zone when its government is deemed unwilling 
to assume its role and responsibility.  By what standard does one measure unwill-
ingness? “Unwillingness” is essentially a subjective standard.  It permits the impo-
sition of an assessment of weakness in governance where a state chooses a govern-
ance model that might not be compatible with some consensus standard or other.  
Consider for example a state that chooses to order its internal affairs on the basis of 
ancient custom and tradition incompatible with international political economic and 
social notions. Moreover, it is not clear how much conflict, inability or unwillingness 
is necessary to trigger the application of the definitions. Is a high crime rate enough?  
Is it enough that a government fails to extend its reach enough to satisfy the taste 
for government of the home states of enterprises seeking to enter into a territory?  
That is hardly velar, but the potential for abuse is quite clear. What is also clear is 
that the concept of weak governance and conflict zones permits a loss of sovereignty 
in a peculiar way—such states remain sovereign in the sense that they remain dis-
tinct political entities, but they lose their sovereignty to the extent that the determi-
 
101. See OECD RISK AWARENESS TOOL, supra note 14, at 42. 
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nation of weak governance or conflict zones opens the door to intervention in domes-
tic affairs either by other public actors—states and international organizations—or 
by private actors.  In theory this may be for the best—especially where the alterna-
tive increases human rights abuses against individuals.  But solicitude comes with 
a price--  
This last point serves as a gateway to a larger concern—who gets to make the 
determination of weak or conflict status.  Both the UNGP and the Risk Awareness 
Tool are silent on this point. Both seem to suggest that the question is not worth 
asking because the answer is well known. In the first instance, international organ-
izations would likely rely on measures developed through international financial in-
stitutions. The World Bank’s “Worldwide Governance Indicators”, 102 for example, 
looks to measures of (1) voice and accountability;103 (2) political stability and the 
absence of violence;104 (3) government effectiveness;105 (4) regulatory quality;106 (5) 
rule of law;107 and (6) control of corruption.108 These measures have been developed 
by and through international communities.  They reflect factors, and definitions of 
factors, that are consonant with the world view and operations of the institution that 
deploy them.  They further an ideology that, in its own way, is a more powerful set 
of techniques for harmonizing projections of regulatory power than any effort at the 
practice of conventional extraterritoriality. The disciplinary character of these 
 
102. The World Bank Group, Worldwide Governance Indicators, available http://info.worldbank.org/ 
governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.  
103. “Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media.” Id., “Voice and accountability, available http://info.worldbank.org/ 
governance/wgi/va.pdf.  
104. “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of 
political instability and/or politically- motivated violence, including terrorism.” Id., “Political 
Stability and the Absence of Violence” available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pv.pdf.  
105. “Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies.” Id., at Government effectiveness, available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/ 
wgi/ge.pdf.  
106. “Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.”  
Id., at Regulatory Quality, available http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/rq.pdf.  
107. “Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” Id., at Rule of Law, available 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/rl.pdf.  
108. “Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state 
by elites and private interests.” Id., at Control of Corruption, available 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/cc.pdf.  
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measures can be discerned by the inclination to use the measures not merely to re-
veal but to rank, and to use ranking to pressure conformity to the principles on which 
the measures are grounded.109 It is not hard to imagine the use of these indicators 
and the power of rankings to establish baselines of legitimacy both in terms of gov-
ernment structure and its normative operations.110 Yet for the moment that disci-
plinary power is fractured. Like the OECD Risk Awareness Tool and the UNGPs, 
no one institution or state “owns” weak or conflict zone standards.111 For institutions 
like the World Bank, this is viewed as either inevitable or necessary. As a conse-
quence their approach to standards construction appear meant to be complementary 
to any number of other measures—and to the institutions whose ideologies of gov-
ernance conformity they reflect.112  There is thus an element of polycentric anar-
chy—a marketplace of standards and the competing ideological agendas on the basis 
of which they are framed—in the sense of emerging multiple measurement struc-
tures without a single ordering principle, in the construction and implementation of 
these standards.   
But whatever the source or techniques used, it is apparent that the government 
of the state affected rarely makes that determination, and usually has even less 
power to object. It might be possible to vest that determination on relevant regional 
associations—for example the Organization of American States or the African Un-
ion, with respect to its own members.  Ought it to be made by the governments of 
the home states of enterprises seeking to engage in activities in these areas?  That 
is implied by the UNGP. But those implications might also produce an unwelcome 
invitation to extend national law, through enterprises, to host states, to serve as a 
substitute, within the areas controlled by the enterprise, of any remnant of host state 
law or governance.  Must the home states use international standards, perhaps like 
those techniques developed by IFIs to make that determination? That may also be 
implied by both UNGP and the OECD Risk Awareness Toolkit. The application of 
international standards would appear, at first blush to eliminate the nationalist el-
ement of extraterritoriality.  Yet if it is left to states, and especially developed states, 
to apply those international standards, the possibility for misapplication remains 
 
109. Robert I. Rotberg, Strengthening Governance: Ranking Countries Would Help, 28(1) THE WASH. Q. 
71-81 (2010). 
110. Oded Löenhelm, Examining the State: A Foucaldian Perspective on International ‘Governance 
Indicators”, 29(2) THIRD WORLD Q. 255-274 (2008). 
111. Compare, for example, the approach of the Worls Bank, supra, notes 103-109, with SUASN E. RICE 
AND STEWART PATRICK, INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Brookings, 2008).  
112. “The WGI are complementary to a large number of other efforts to construct more detailed 
measures of governance, often just for a single country.  Users are also encouraged to consult the 
disaggregated individual indicators underlying the composite WGI scores to gain more insights into 
the particular areas of strengths and weaknesses identified by the data.” Id., available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc.  
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substantial.  Many states might be unable to resist the temptation to apply their 
own national version of international law and to project that outward. For some, 
especially in developing states, in whose territory such determinations are most 
likely to be implemented, the functional effect of these regimes might begin to look 
like the old colonial system.113  But rather than endure projections of power directly 
through the application of military force, power projections are made through the 
invocation of international soft law devices.  And, indeed, the UNGP are written to 
push enterprises into consultation with home state governments, and for home state 
governments to project their own domestic legal orders (including hopefully some 
measure of international norms transposed into national law) as the framework for 
monitoring, assistance and sanctions. 
C.  Risk and Complicity.   
If issues of coherence and identification focus on the constitution of states that 
may be targeted for analysis and action under the UNGP and OECD standards, then 
issues of complicity and risk focus on the triggers for actions by enterprises. One of 
the most interesting aspects of the two standards touch on the anchors chosen by 
each around which to order their governance framework. The two ordering concepts 
are not the same. That alone produces coherence and coordination issues—the “lan-
guage” of each is different enough that each might require different approaches to 
implementing the sort of human rights due diligence at the heart of the UNGP.  
Ironically, both were deemed necessary to incorporate the requirements developed 
within their respective frameworks.   
For the UNGP, the anchor is complicity.  For the OECD Risk Awareness Tool, the 
anchor is risk.  For the UNGP, the foundation of enterprise action is legal; under the 
Risk Awareness Tool the foundation is economics. Complicity points to the issue of 
legal compliance—explicitly referenced in the UNGP.  Risk points to the objectives 
of enterprises understood in terms of gain and loss.114 They thus point in somewhat 
different directions.  For the Risk Awareness Tool, legal non-compliance (including 
 
113. Discussed in Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization Ascendant:  Four Perspectives on the 
Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global Order, 17(1) BERKELEY LA RAZA LAW JOURNAL 
141-168 (2006).  
114. This is emphasized by the U.N. Global Compact, from which the Risk Awareness Tool draws.  See 
OECD RISK AWARENESS TOOL, supra note 15, at 14 n.3; See U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, BUSINESS 
GUIDE TO CONFLICT IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT (June 2002), 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Peace_and_Business/BusinessGuide.pdf. The 
Guide to Impact Assessment is meant to help companies create conflict impact risk strategies to 
further sustainable business environments in the face of operational risk. It is organized as a matrix 
of risk assessment, id. at 7-10, and questions for management, id. at 11-27. 
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presumably the risk of liability through application of complicity principles) is a sub-
set of risk analysis.115 The emphasis is on the aggregate effect of choices on reputa-
tion and performance. For the UNGP, risk is a subset of compliance, including legal 
compliance. Those might arise from out of the relationship contemplated by Princi-
ple 7 between the enterprise and its home state.  Or it may arise autonomously from 
out of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights by reference to the Inter-
national Bill of Human Rights.  
Yet both then produce limitations on their respective scope that might make them 
less useful in practice. UNGP §17 does note, in its commentary to the general frame-
work for human rights due diligence that complicity has both a legal and non-legal 
meaning.  It points to the societal consequences of business enterprises being “per-
ceived as being ‘complicit’ in the acts of another party where, for example, they are 
seen to benefit from an abuse committed by that party.”116 But it is not clear how 
that societal complicity concept carries over to weak governance zones, where, in-
deed, the formative act of complicity is to fail to apply at least the core international 
law standards to the enterprises’ behavior.  
The risk approach avoids interdiction.  It suggests the costs of decisions made in 
the course of operation in weak governance zones speaks to consequences, but within 
them legal complicity, or even societal complicity, form a subset of those factors that 
might be considered.  And it suggests the “business case” against making certain 
decisions, in terms of the overall aggregate effect on performance, as that is usually 
understood in a business context.  But an enterprise may indeed engage in such 
analysis and decide that the risk, including the legal risk, is worth the reward. And 
where the legal risk can be contained—within a subsidiary or in a contractual rela-
tionship, then the overall risk to the enterprise as a whole may be reduced further 
still.  A complicity standard, on the other hand, is meant to impose limits on the 
range of choices implied by risk analysis. And those limitations are based on public 
law concerns—the public policy of state, especially as it reflects emerging interna-
tional norms.  Some have taken that analysis farther and suggested a duty on the 
part of enterprises to circumvent the law of weak governance zone states where to 
do so furthers the corporate responsibility to respect.117  But that, itself, could sug-
gest both a broader view of complicity standards and a danger to enterprises, one 
 
115. See OECD RISK AWARENESS TOOL, supra note 14, at 40-41 (defining “risk”). 
116. UNGP, supra note 7, § 17, at 18-19. 
117. See INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & BUS., FROM RED TO GREEN FLAGS: THE CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS IN HIGH-RISK COUNTRIES 3 (2011) (it suggested a more 
complex analysis, though one still grounded on legal compliance as a touchstone: “Do national, 
international and soft law collectively provide instruments that enable companies to meet their 
responsibilities. . . .  Probably not. Though companies should not break the law, they can (and often 
should) go beyond it when national governance is weak or corrupt.  Where national laws positively 
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bound up in legal rather than societal constraints.  That framework will produce a 
different approach to decision making, narrower and more formal, but also one with 
its own dangers.  
D. The Perils of the Heightened Managerial Care Standard.  
The Risk Awareness Tool is grounded on its implementation by enterprises under 
a “heightened managerial care standard.”118 It is described as a variant of the risk 
management term “due care.”119 Yet the term also carries with it the echo of a legal 
standard of “care” for determining the standard of compliance by directors with their 
duties to the enterprise.  Thus the Risk Awareness Tool may also carry with it the 
possibility of affecting the way in which a legal standard applicable to director duty, 
might be applied in a legal proceeding. Indeed, the focus of the heightened care ob-
ligation tracks the legal standard for duty of care applied under the corporate codes 
of many U.S. States. This avenue of corporate governance has generated some inter-
est among academic commentators.120  But it remains primarily an abstract discus-
sion.  On the other hand, the argument from contract may be more fruitful.  Might 
it be possible for a court to determine that the decision of an enterprise to conform 
to the standards of the Risk Awareness Tool has the effect of imposing a higher legal 
duty of care in line with the heightened care standard of the Risk Awareness Tool 
itself? That legal duty might be derived from contract.  It could not bind the enter-
prise where these contractual obligations contradict baseline corporate fiduciary ob-
ligations to the enterprise and its shareholders. But within that set of constraints, it 
might bind the enterprise (though not its directors). Yet, even that possibility raises 
another set of risks for the enterprise, one perhaps of similar magnitude to the risks 
assessed relating to operation in weak governance zones.  
E. Legitimate and Illegitimate Political Activities.  
The Risk Awareness Tool devotes substantial attention to the issue of legitimate 
and illegitimate political activity by enterprises in weak governance zones. Improper 
involvement in political activity is subject to an objective and a subjective test.  The 
former focuses on the host and home states, the latter on sensibilities beyond the 
host states (with effects on conduct within the host state). The objective test is a 
 
obstruct adherence to the ‘Respect’ framework (by restricting public meetings, or formation of trade 
unions, for example), companies need to circumvent the law creatively.”); accord id. at 33-42. 
118. See OECD RISK AWARENESS TOOL, supra note 14, at 36-37 (defining “heightened managerial care”). 
119. Id. 
120. See, e.g., Jena Martin, Business and Human Rights: What’s the Board Got to Do With It?,  U. ILL. L. 
REV. 959 (2003); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to 
Consider Human Rights?, 74 U.CIN.L.REV. 75 (2005).   . 
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simple illegality standard—the political activity is improper if it is illegal in either 
home or host state.121  But that raises the problem of extraterritoriality indirectly.  
If conduct is legal in the host state, may a home state affect host state legal norms 
by enforcing an inconsistent home state legal standard through enterprises operat-
ing within the host state?  If so, the interference with sovereignty originates in home 
states, and the enterprise serves as an instrument of the projection of regulatory 
power beyond the borders of the projecting state. That ought to be problematic.  The 
response, of course, is that this is necessary in those territories already suffering 
from institutional failures.  It appears that where governments are weak or col-
lapsed, other states have a freer hand, through their enterprises, to export their 
laws.  This is especially problematic when such exporting is undertaken through 
state owned enterprises, where the role of the state might be more direct, and the 
conduct of the enterprise might be of more direct interest to the home state govern-
ment. The second, subjective, test—whether the enterprise would feel comfortable if 
their political activities were transparently reported in detail in the media.  There 
again, the referent is not the sensibilities of the host state, but rather the global 
community.  The standard furthers the objectives of harmonization of notions of le-
gitimacy as an international matter.  But it does so without much participation by 
the sovereign rights holders of the jurisdiction in which its effects will be most felt. 
From the perspective of functional effect—the primary driver of the Risk Awareness 
Tool—the result is net positive; from the perspective of theory and democratic prin-
ciple, the result is at best mixed.     
Similar issues arise in the context of the definition of legitimate political activities 
of enterprises122 in at least one respect.  The Risk Awareness Tool defines legitimate 
political activity in part by reference to its purpose.  That purpose is defined as the 
promotion of “better participatory processes and a competitive market environ-
ment.”123  That purpose is then complemented by a number of additional require-
ments: good faith, transparency, and working partnership with indigenous individ-
uals and organizations.124  For states whose political systems, and cultural tastes do 
not run to those of advanced western democracies this invitation to political partici-
pation may smack of interference, and not just interference but as an invitation to 
dismantle system in favor of something else.  On the other hand, IFIs have long been 
criticized for these efforts as well through their loan and technical assistance work. 
The definition, of course, may be inevitable given the thrust of the Risk Awareness 
 
121. See OECD RISK AWARENESS TOOL, supra note 14, at 37-38 (defining “improper involvement in local 
political activities”). 
122. Id. at 38-39 (defining “legitimate political activity”). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
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Tool’s emphasis on the societal obligations of enterprises.125  Yet that may also be 
the problem.  If foreign enterprises are encouraged to participate in the political pro-
cesses of host states, or to direct their local operation’s participation in host state 
politics, and they are encouraged to do this for their self-interest, it might be as likely 
that this activity will weaken rather than strengthen local governance.  It certainly 
runs the risk of shifting the locus of power from popular centers and local elites, to 
the enterprises that may seek to inject themselves in local politics, even if they do 
this through local association.  The Risk Awareness Tool candidly explains that a 
segment of the business community consulted strongly opposed political involve-
ment for fear that it would be difficult to police the legitimate-illegitimate divide.126 
But it errs on the side of participation—and perhaps not unreasonably in light of the 
strong premise of societal purpose in both the OECD Guidelines and the UNGP.  But 
policing that divide will prove to be a problem, and the demarcation of that divide 
remains problematic even in advance industrial states.127  
F. The Projection of the Ideology of BITs into the Private Sphere. 
The move toward an internationalized institutionalization of enterprise responsi-
bility in weak governance and conflict zones has not occurred in a vacuum.  Beyond 
its intimate connection with the development of normative and administrative struc-
tures for CSR regimens in public and private sectors, weak governance zones rules 
reflect, in part, and must be understood within, developments in the consensus 
structuring of trade and investment regimes among states, especially those articu-
lated in bilateral investment treaties (BITs).  The convergence is to some extent con-
scious.  The United States, for example, has declared that its BIT program have as 
their core objectives to “[p]rotect investment abroad; [e]ncourage the adoption of 
market-oriented domestic policies that treat private investment in an open, trans-
parent, and non-discriminatory way; and [s]upport the development of international 
law standards consistent with these objectives.”128 
Those objectives point to an important development in the ideology of interna-
tional trade that is increasingly embedded in the international legal framework 
within which cross border investment is structured. The ideology increasingly looks 
to the internationalization of domestic law and its application as such in determin-
ing disputes between investors and states. The idea is that the BIT itself effectively 
 
125. See id. at 31-33. 
126. Id. at 31. 
127. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
128. Bilateral Investment Treaties and Related Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/ 
e/eb/ifd/bit/index.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).   
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internationalizes domestic law, in the sense that domestic law assimilated interna-
tional law into its framework as general principles of law and because by their char-
acter these BITs pulled its subject matter out of a purely domestic legal context.129  
Where that view has been rejected, an alternative basis of internationalization is 
put forth—that though domestic law may be applicable, only that part of domestic 
law not in conflict with principles of international law would be applied.130  Though 
the specifics of BIT dispute resolution processes have advanced substantially since 
the 1980s, the ideological framework, overlaying domestic law with the constraints 
of international law and its principles, remains. 
That ideological line—internationalizing obligations within a domestic legal order 
appear as well in the context of corporate responsibility in weak governance or con-
flict zones.  The consequences can be significant.  If the foundational ideology of BITs 
embraces notions of legal internationalization with respect to business conduct 
touching on investment, then it is possible that this approach can be applied as well 
to the private conduct of business in weak governance or conflict zones. Indeed, en-
terprises might be safer applying the domestic law of such zones only to the extent 
of its conformity to general principles of international law in order to conform their 
behavior generally to expectations of business conduct.  In effect, what BIT culture 
with respect to internationalization may accomplish is to amplify and manage the 
approach of enterprises in selecting the nature and form of its responsibility in weak 
governance and conflict zones.  That internationalization, though may also work 
against those with an expansive notion of the sort of international law that enter-
prises ought to apply in those zones. Specifically, a narrow reading of legal interna-
tionalization may preclude the effective implementation of the UNGP or the OECD 
Guidelines precisely because they are not international law.  On the other hand, 
their acceptance within the business community may suggest that as a matter of 
international practice some of UNGP or the OECD Guidelines compliance may be a 
necessary component of determining the form in which domestic law would have to 
be applied by the enterprise in such zones.  
What clearly emerges, however, is that even a narrow reading of the enterprise 
obligations in weak governance or conflict zones under these standards likely takes 
as its starting point the ideological approach of BITs and its expectations of legal 
internationalization.  That will mean that whatever normative framework is ap-
plied, the domestic legal order of states in weak governance or conflict zones may 
not be unquestioningly applied as written or as traditionally implemented.  Rather, 
 
129. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Gov’t of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978); Revere 
Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corp., 17 I.L.M. 1321 (1978). 
130. See Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Gov’t of the Libyan Arab Republic, 20 I.L.M. 1 (1981); 
Am. Indep. Oil Co. (AMINOIL) v. Kuwait, 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982). 
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enterprises will have to carefully choose how to approach such domestic legal order-
ings in light of emerging international law principles sand standards including those 
of the OECD Guidelines and the UNGP.  That appeared to be the position taken in 
2006 by the business sector.  In a paper prepared by the International Organisation 
of Employers (IOE), in collaboration with the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) and the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) to the OECD,131 
the legal internationalization was taken as a matter of course.132   
Within this embedding of the cultures of BITs within weak governance and con-
flict zone responsibility regimes, then, has another important consequence.  It moves 
us toward the last significant issue implicated in their construction—the role of the 
lawyer (governmental lawyers, in house counsel or counsel for NGOs, for example)—
in the enforcement of these emerging governance frameworks.  That is the subject 
taken up next.   
G. Enforcement and the Role of Lawyers. 
Enforcement of legal norms within the domestic legal orders of the states respon-
sible for their implementation tends to be straightforward.  Traditionally that rela-
tionship between the state, judicial or administrative authority, and law served as 
the boundaries of enterprise activity of interest to lawyers.  But the rise of soft law 
systems at the international level has added a level of complexity, as well as ambi-
guity to the issue of enforcement, and consequently to the nature of the lawyer’s role 
in advising the enterprise that faces choices under these governance frameworks. 
The UNGP and OCED systems provide an excellent example of both, as well as the 
traps that now face both enterprises and lawyers within regimes that are not for-
mally legal but function like law in some respects.  
The UNGP are not directly enforceable in the conventional sense.133  They are, as 
their name suggests, guiding principles directed to states and enterprises.  They are 
meant to provide a framework within which states might better undertake their du-
ties under national and international law (and norms to the extent that states might 
be convinced to give them legal effect) as a basis for approaching policy choices.  
States are encouraged to sharpen their compliance by creating and implementing 
 
131. THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES, supra note 5. 
132. They suggested as an approach to legal compliance two relevant actions.  First, “Determine national 
legal obligations and structure operations to ensure compliance. If there are no such obligations or 
structures, reference to international human rights instruments may provide guidance.” Id. at 5. 
Second, to “Promote the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 
its operations and in its relationship with suppliers.” Id. 
133. UNGP, supra note 8, at 1 (“Nothing in these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new 
international law obligations, or as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may have 
undertaken or be subject to under international law with regard to human rights”). 
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“national action plans,” though these, like the UNGP themselves, have no legal ef-
fect in and of themselves.134 In a similar way they provide a framework within which 
enterprises understand the scope of the societal norms that may assert an effect on 
their operations—not as “law” but as the consequences of failing to meet the expec-
tations of enterprises’ stakeholders.  This so-called business case for the UNGP,135 
is grounded in firm economics and self-interest.  Societal norms shape the environ-
ment in which enterprises may maximize their welfare.  Breaches of these societal 
norms will consequently increase risk of reducing income or the viability of activity. 
When such reductions are severe enough they might lead to liability, usually for 
breaches of duty.  
For the lawyer, this means an emphasis on risk and compliance auditing.  Human 
rights due diligence generally provides a useful framework for such compliance and 
risk auditing. While the risks could be legal at the outer boundaries, the societal 
nature of the UNGP “responsibility to respect” principles speak more to business 
risk.  The basis for that risk, though, is normative and framed by the UNGP.  It also 
means an additional emphasis on counseling for the conceptualization and imple-
mentation of internal corporate governance and operational rules—employee codes, 
supplier codes of conduct, compliance with their party norms (sourcing and vendor 
payments), and the like. This internal law of the enterprises is as much an issue of 
policy for the enterprise as it is a matter of “lawmaking” understood in its functional 
and contractual (private law) sense.136  The private law of the enterprise produces a 
transnational code effective within the enterprise and its supply chain, one that in-
teracts with a large and varied set of national law over parts of its operation.137 
Where the “business case” for the UNGP is embraced, then its “soft law” character 
can become hard via the governance contract system that constitutes corporate 
transnational self-government. But that also requires the lawyer to counsel the en-
terprise seeking to harmonize the law of its internal operations respecting those in-
stances in which rule consolidation is warranted and those situations in which it 
does not—and to some extent the object of the UNGP seeks to inform the enterprise 
 
134. See National Action Plans, BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR., http://business-humanrights.org/en/un- 
 guiding-principles/implementation-tools-examples/implementation-by-governments/by-type-of- 
 initiative/national-action-plans (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). 
135. See, e.g., Operationalize the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, ACTION 2020, 
http://action2020.org/business-solutions/operationalize-the-un-guiding-principles-on-business-and-
human (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). 
136. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Governance Without Government:  An Overview, in BEYOND 
TERRITORIALITY:  TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 87 (Günther 
Handl et al. eds., 2012). 
137. See Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of Transnational 
Regulation, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 499 (2008). 
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(and its lawyers) in making these decisions.138 Where the enterprise operates in a 
conflict zone, the internal law of the enterprise may be the only effective governance 
system applicable on the ground.  
Like the UNGP, the OECD Guidelines and its complementary Risk Awareness 
Tool, is not directly enforceable.139  This framework applies to the UNGP, as it has 
been incorporated into the OECD Guidelines.140  To that extent, they are of interest 
to the lawyer in the way the UNGP are—risk and compliance will tend to dictate the 
scope and extent of an embrace of the guidelines within the enterprises’ culture and 
written into its internal law (by lawyers mostly). But unlike the UNGP, the OECD 
Guidelines does include an implementation procedure.141 The OECD Guidelines 
provide for the establishment of National Contact Points (NCP) within OECD Mem-
ber State governments, “undertaking promotional activities, handling enquiries and 
contributing to the resolution of issues that arise relating to the implementation of 
the Guidelines in specific instances, taking account of the attached procedural guid-
ance.”142  Most of the activities of the NCPs are of small interest to the enterprise 
and its lawyers, except one—the authority to contribute to the resolution of disputes 
arising when an actor brings a claim to the NCP that an enterprise has failed to 
comply with its obligations under the OECD Guidelines. Though these actions have 
no formal legal or binding effect, because they function like a fact-finding determi-
nation that might have business risk implications, these proceedings become of in-
terest to lawyers.  And they have become of greater interest to global civil society 
actors who view specific interest claims as a means of forcing functional compliance 
outside of national law but effected through an organ of national government. For 
most NCP jurisdictions, the extent of involvement in these specific instances is lim-
ited to sometimes quite anemic efforts to mediate disputes.  Failure of mediation 
ends their involvement.  For a few jurisdictions, these disputes might lead to written 
recommendations and quasi-judicial fact-finding.  But even the threat of a specific 
instance may pose risk to a company, risks which have produced efforts to settle 
 
138. While the UNGP might favor application of a “most favored nations” approach to consolidation, 
business would likely prefer governance fracture where that reduces costs without raising 
compliance costs or legal risk. 
139. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 3 (the guidelines “provide non-binding principles and 
standards for responsible business conduct in a global context consistent with applicable laws and 
internationally recognized standards.”). 
140. See OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 31-34. 
141. See Larry Catá Backer, Rights and Accountability in Development (‘RAID’) v Das Air and Global 
Witness v Afrimex: Small Steps Toward an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the 
Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 258 (2009). 
142. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 68. 
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these specific instances before these proceedings become public or fester.143 This be-
comes an important element of the risk calculus of lawyers especially in conflict zones 
(UNGP) or in weak governance zones, with respect to which civil society actors may 
have a greater incentive to bring claims (because of the absence of a state). 
But these considerations do not end the analysis of “soft” enforcement.  Increas-
ingly, regional human rights organs have begun to incorporate the OECD Guide-
lines and the UNGP within the body of international law that they oversee.  Enter-
prises may see their operations subject to review by regional human rights 
organizations seeking compliance with the OECD Guidelines and the UNGP. In the 
context of allegations of gross human rights abuses these instruments may play a 
greater role where operations are undertaken in weak governance zones or conflict 
areas. Thus, for example, the African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights is em-
powered to apply relevant African and international instruments.144  The Inter-
American Commission for Human Rights individuals may petition determining the 
human rights responsibilities of OAS Member States that allege violations of the 
human rights guaranteed in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man (“the American Declaration”), the American Convention on Human Rights 
(“the American Convention”), and other inter-American human rights treaties.  En-
terprise complicity may be part of that petition or may be used as evidence.  In either 
case the enterprise may be involved in a proceeding that may raise its rise and po-
tentially its compliance exposure.  Taken together, what is beginning to emerge is a 
picture in which the hard law-soft law divide has become increasingly irrelevant 
either to determine enterprise risk, or the role of lawyers in counseling enterprises 
for “legal” compliance.  Where the enterprise operates in weak governance or conflict 
zones, the exposure grows, and the avenues for functionally effective enforcement.  
Yet as a consequence, the gaps, conflict and tensions within the Risk Awareness Tool 
and UNGP weak or conflict zone standards, some of which have been noted in this 
section, become more important to the development of a coherent regulatory re-
sponse to the issues posed in weak or conflict zones.  
 
143. See Larry Catá Backer, Realizing Socio-Economic Rights Under Emerging Global Regulatory 
Frameworks: The Potential Impact of Privatization and the Role of Companies in China and India, 
45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 615 (2013) (some discussion on national contact points). 
144. Super User, African Court in Brief, THE AFRICAN COURT OF HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (April 
28, 2015), http://en.african-court.org/index.php/component/k2/item/29-k2-african-court-in-brief 
(“The Court has jurisdiction over all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the 
interpretation and application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the (the 
Charter), the Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States 
concerned.”).  
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III. Conclusion. 
The management of economic activity now increasingly seamlessly organized as 
functionally differentiated global systems within and among an architecture of do-
mestic legal orders and international public and private normative orderings of dif-
fering legitimacy and authority has created an environment of governance complex-
ity145 whose parameters are only recently being addressed as the processes of CSR 
governance have helped “constitute the objects which come to be governed.”146 Com-
plexity assumes a specific character when enterprises operate in territories in which 
the institutions of the state are weak or where there may be conflict, they face unique 
challenges.  Over the last decade two international organizations have sought to 
provide some basis guide corporations in determining how they should conduct their 
activities in that context. Here, both frameworks were explored. Also explored were 
the ways that CSR has been transformed, in some respects, from to a mandate for 
assuming governance responsibilities in those states unable or unwilling to institute 
systems of law that conform to international consensus standards on human rights 
into something new, and explored a number of issues that have neither been re-
solved nor might they promote the intended effect.   
Both the UNGP and the Risk Awareness Tool have significantly advanced the 
framework within which enterprises can understand and mold their behaviors in 
territories in which there are failures of government. The UNGP relies heavily on 
the state as a principal means of disciplining home state enterprises, and through 
them their supply chain relations. International law and norms are advanced 
through state management of enterprise extraterritorial operation in conflict zones, 
and through legal compliance programs focusing on international standards.  The 
Risk Awareness Tool more heavily focuses on the enterprise as the bearer of inter-
national law and norms within weak governance zone. Though it, too, would have 
the enterprise look to its home state for guidance in the absence of rule of law frame-
works in the zones in which they operate. Both approaches are thus grounded on the 
superiority of international norms, irrespective of their character as law within the 
domestic legal orders of states, but in distinct ways. Both acknowledge the autonomy 
of enterprises as directly responsible for the operationalization of international 
norms wherever they operate. Yet both also open the door to extraterritorial appli-
cation of law.  The same framework that advances the governance autonomy of en-
terprises also envisions them as the vehicles through which home states may project 
 
145. See Bob Jessop, The Governance of Complexity and the complexity of Governance: Preliminary 
Remarks on Some Problems and Limits of Economic Guidance, in BEYOND MARKET AND 
HIERARCHY: INTERACTIVE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL COMPLEXITY 95 (Ash Amin & Jerzy Hausner 
eds., 1997).  
146. Id. at 124 (“these objects do not fully pre-exist the process of governance”). 
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national power within host states with weak governance regimes. And this tension 
built into both frameworks, a tension that goes to the dual character of enterprises 
as both autonomous governance actors and as creatures of the states in which they 
are domiciled, marks the potential and the challenge to the internationalization of 
regimes of CSR.   
 
